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ABSTRACT 
 
Laboratory safety has recently become more of an imperative in research 
laboratories than it has ever been in the past.  Recent accidents at several universities 
have escalated the awareness of safety concerns in laboratory workspaces among the 
general public and created a greater need for a stronger culture of safety in chemistry 
research overall.  Historically, results and publications have been the top priority of most 
researchers, not laboratory safety.   
 
This thesis discusses a number of laboratory accidents.  The first happened in 
December of 2008 at the University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) and resulted in 
the death of a graduate student researcher.  Many safety concerns and violations 
contributed to the fatality.  The second accident happened in June of 2014 at the 
University of Minnesota (UMN).  This incident involved an explosion in a fume hood 
that caused injuries to the researcher as well as a great deal of damage to the hood and 
experimental setup.  Various minor incidents at the University of Vermont (UVM) are 
also discussed with regards to the effects on laboratory safety at the university.   
 
Universities around the country have been able to learn from these accidents in 
order to prevent similar occurrences in the future.  These accidents and their safety 
ramifications at UCLA, UMN, and UVM are the focus of this thesis.  The safety 
programs at each of these universities are examined and compared with respect to how 
the incidents have facilitated necessary changes.  Finally, future goals and opportunities 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
1.1. A Brief History of Safety in the Literature 
Laboratory safety has become more of an imperative in research laboratories than 
it ever has been.1-4 This change is partially due to recent high profile accidents at 
prestigious universities that have increased the awareness of safety concerns in laboratory 
workspaces to the general public.5 
There have been numerous journal articles in recent years specifically regarding 
laboratory safety and ways of generating a more pronounced culture of safety in 
academic institutions, both in safety education6-9 and basic laboratory safety.1, 3, 10-11 
However, there are only a few articles from the early 1900s that strictly deal with general 
laboratory safety.12-17 These articles are outdated based on modern safety standards, 
though there were various tips and ideas that are still useful in chemistry laboratories 
today.  For example, a discussion of how to properly store potentially hazardous 
chemicals appeared in 1925.13 The article discusses detailed demonstrations to perform 
for researchers to understand their laboratory hazards and how improper storage could 
create a laboratory fire.  One such example was to form a flat disk of dried ammonium 
nitrate on an asbestos sheet, cover with a layer of dried zinc dust, put one drop of water in 
a hollow in the chemicals, and wait for there to be a reaction.12 There are other ways of 
describing what improper storage could lead to in a laboratory, but as Davison points out 
in the article, “the thought of safety in storage will be quickened by those who try out 
some of the demonstrations here recorded.”12 As safety progressed into being a higher 
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concern in laboratories, these types of demonstrations became obsolete as much as 
unnecessarily risky. 
As initially pointed out in the article, one portion of any safety program should 
include proper chemical storage.  There are various charts and tables that are available to 
help determine how chemicals should be stored and with which other chemicals.18-20 
Such distinctions highlight two aspects to storage, reactivity of different classes of 
chemicals and regulations (including requirements such as labeling).  Some charts focus 
more on the reactivity of different classes of chemicals or two individual chemicals.18 For 
instance, the tables on the University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) website give 
examples of what chemicals should not be stored together (e.g. cyanides and acids).18 The 
University of Vermont (UVM) and the University of Minnesota (UMN) focus on the 
specific storage of the chemicals but in conjunction with how to properly label the 
containers.19-20 UMN in particular focuses a good deal on the regulatory reasoning for 
why chemicals need to be where and how they are stored, referencing the Laboratory 
Safety Plan, Employee Right to Know, and the National Fire Protection Association in 
the storage guide.19 
Another article from 1925 concentrated on treating students that had been 
exposed to a poisonous chemical.13 There are suggested treatment options that include 
counteracting the ingested poison with other chemicals.  A treatment of “alkalies” is 
suggested, “[giving] dilute acid, hydrochloric, acetic, vinegar, lemon juice, orange juice 
or a fixed oil” among others to the exposed researcher.13 Among the options medical 
 3 
attention is not included, which would be the principal suggestion today.  Many of the 
suggested treatment options directly oppose what current safety data sheets (SDS) 
describe as best practices for what should, or should not, be done.  For instance, there is a 
disparity between the article and the current SDS for sulfuric acid.  Turner’s article 
suggests inducing vomiting, which is in conflict with the SDS: “Rinse mouth. Do NOT 
induce vomiting.”13, 21 This article is most similar to potential trainings researchers may 
receive regarding what to do in an emergency.  In emergency response training at the 
University of Vermont, various emergencies are discussed, including what to do in case 
of exposure, fire, injury, etc.a Turner’s article, though the information is outdated, was in 
an attempt to make researchers more proactive and prepared for any actuality. 
Key lessons to take away from these early articles related to laboratory safety are 
that there is always a need for emergency preparedness and there is always room for 
improvement, especially as new information becomes available.  At the time the articles 
were published, the suggestions and information would likely have been the best 
available.  Rather than using prior practices because they are established, awareness 
about current laboratory safety developments and the hazards involved needs to be 
increased to mitigate risk. 
                                                
a The list of topics discussed in emergency response trainings is from UVM’s safety 
training, “Emergency Response for Laboratory Workers.”  
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1.2. Thesis Goals 
The analysis of recent serious accidents at the University of California, Los 
Angeles (UCLA) and the University of Minnesota (UMN) is the initial focus of this 
thesis.  The safety programs at these two universities and the University of Vermont 
(UVM) will be compared and contrasted as well as accidents at all three universities.  
Once the similarities and differences have been discussed, future goals and opportunities 
will be suggested for UVM.   
The goal of this analysis is to determine gaps in the safety program at UVM with 
regards to the program modifications made over the last five years at UVM, UCLA, and 
UMN.  The safety gaps and areas for improvement are to be informed by the incidents at 
the three universities. 
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CHAPTER 2: University of California, Los Angeles 
2.1. Incident Description 
On December 29, 2008, during the holiday break, a deadly accident occurred at 
UCLA that was preventable.  The researcher involved in the accident was scaling up a 
reaction she had performed that October after starting work in Professor Harran’s 
laboratory.1 The reaction, according to her notebook, is shown in Figure 1.  The initial 
step of the reaction was to generate vinyl lithium via the reaction of vinyl bromide with 
two equivalents of tert-butyl lithium (tBuLi).1 
 
 
Figure 1: TOP reaction: Synthesis of vinyl lithium from the reaction of vinyl bromide and tBuLi. 
BOTTOM reaction: Targeted synthesis of 4-hydroxy-4-vinyldecane from vinyl lithium and 4-
decanone. 
 
As mentioned, when the reaction had been completed in October, it was on a 
smaller scale.  In that run, anhydrous ether (28 mL) was added to a dry 200 mL round 
bottom flask.  Vinyl bromide (3.0 mL) was added to the anhydrous ether in the flask and 
stirred at –78 °C.  After 15 minutes, 53.79 mL of 1.67 M tBuLi in pentane was added to 
the mixture and stirred for another 2 hours, followed by increasing the temperature of the 
solution to 0 °C for 30 minutes, and finally returning the solution to –78 °C. In a separate 
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flask, ether (6 mL) and 4-decanone (3.90 mL) were mixed, cooled, and transferred to the 
flask containing the solution of vinyl lithium.  The reaction was stirred at –78 °C for two 
hours.  The temperature was then increased to –10 °C before quenching the excess tBuLi 
with sodium bicarbonate.  This reaction yielded 3.60 g of 4-hydroxy-4-vinyldecane at 
86.75% crude yield.1 In December, the objective was to increase the reaction scale to 
produce an overall yield of about three times as much product. 
The reaction in December required the researcher to use 159.5 mL of 1.69 M 
tBuLi in pentane.  The total volume was obtained using a 60 mL syringe to measure 
approximately 50 mL at a time in three additional steps.  The researcher was working in a 
fume hood (Figure 2) with a Schlenk line.  Also located in the hood, there was an open 
flask of hexane.   
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Figure 2: The fume hood that was used by the researcher at the time of the incident. 
 
The initial problem began when the plunger came out of the syringe and the tBuLi, a 
known pyrophoric reagent at the concentration.  The solution ignited when it came into 
contact with air.  When this happened, the flask of hexane was spilled and the solvent 
ignited.  Unfortunately, the researcher was wearing neither a flame-resistant laboratory 
coat nor other protective clothing, and her sweater caught fire.  Though there was a safety 
shower in the laboratory, it was not used.  Instead, another researcher in the laboratory 
tried to smother the flames on the researcher with his laboratory coat.  When this did not 
appear to be working, he poured water on her from a nearby laboratory sink.2 
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Throughout the incident, the researcher was reported to be conscious and even 
speaking at times to the other members of her group.1 When the emergency responders 
arrived on the scene, the fire was extinguished though the damage was already done (see 
Figure 3 for the damage to the laboratory alone). 
 
 
Figure 3: The burn marks on the floor from the fire after the 2008 UCLA laboratory death. 
 
The medical personnel used the safety shower for decontamination of the researcher, then 
she was brought to UCLA Ronald Reagan Medical Center, and finally, she was 
transferred to Grossman Burn Center — over 40% of her body was covered in 3rd degree 
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burns.  She died about two-and-a-half weeks later, on January 16, 2009, due to the 
injuries she suffered on that day.1 
 
2.2. Ramifications from the Incident 
There were many legal and non-legal implications for both the university and the 
laboratory supervisor resulting from this incident.  However, aside from the legal details, 
the potential dangers of working in a chemistry laboratory were thrust into the public’s 
view.  This story made headlines nationwide in chemistry journals and among chemists, 
but also in mainstream news outlets.3 This incident was something that could not be 
ignored and for good reason. 
2.2.1. Legal Ramifications for the University 
In 2009, the California Occupational Health and Safety Administration 
(Cal/OSHA) determined that the accident was a result of safety lapses and inadequate 
training.2, 4 The researcher’s training should have minimally included how to properly 
handle pyrophoric reagents including tBuLi as well as where to find the emergency 
equipment and how to use it if necessary (e.g., the safety shower).  For the university, this 
resulted in the required creation of a $500,000 scholarship in the researcher’s name and a 
complete overhaul of the safety program (Section 2.2.3).2 Cal/OSHA’s investigation cited 
poor training, poor technique/improper method, lack of supervision, employees not 
wearing required personal protective equipment (PPE), and flammable liquids and 
volatile chemicals stored improperly.1, 5 The lengthy list of citations highlighted the need 
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for many of the changes that were consequently made to the safety program at UCLA as 
a direct result of the investigation.   
Aside from the costs of the scholarship and safety program adjustments, the 
university was required to pay legal fees.  Though there was no direct punitive action 
against UCLA, the legal fees alone were about $4.5 million covering both the university 
and the principle investigator (PI) for the laboratory.6-7 In comparison to what the 
university has spent on laboratory safety increases, updates, and required changes, the 
legal fees were small.  The laboratory safety adjustments have cost the university 
upwards of $20 million dollars as of October 2014.7 The use of this money, in updates 
consistent with current best practices, will be outlined subsequently in Section 2.2.3. 
2.2.2. Legal Ramifications for the Laboratory Supervisor 
Separate from the penalties against the university—including the scholarship and 
changes to the safety program—the laboratory supervisor, or principle investigator (PI), 
was charged with four felony counts of willful violation of state occupational health and 
safety standards in the December of 2011, the first time in which a PI faced criminal 
charges for failure to meet standards.6 As a result, this incident was reported in 
mainstream media coverage.3 Many of Cal/OSHA’s citations, mentioned above, were 
debated throughout the legal case with the PI.  For instance, as laboratory supervisor, the 
professor is responsible for any training that is required for researchers working in the 
laboratory.8 The supervisor does not necessarily need to deliver the trainings personally, 
but he or she must ensure that required trainings have been completed before work 
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commences.  The case against Professor Harran was settled after the better part of five 
years in June of 2014.  Two punitive results of the settlement were 800 hours of 
community service and a $10,000 fine to be paid to the burn unit where the researcher 
was treated.8 Other outcomes from the trial require Professor Harran to teach a 
preparatory organic chemistry course to inner city high school graduates and speak about 
laboratory safety to new graduate students in the chemistry department at UCLA.8  
When researching this accident and its subsequent outcomes, it was evident that a 
dialogue had been started involving both chemists and non-chemists.  The community 
responded to not only the outcome but also the progression of the case as it was 
happening.  Some responses to the case’s outcome were that the researcher should be 
responsible for him/herself and know the reagents and hazards that will be handled before 
running any experiment.8 However, most responses questioned if the penalties were 
enough of a punishment for what happened, explaining that the PI should have been more 
aware of the safety concerns in his laboratory and trained his researchers accordingly.9-13 
This case has had such a large impact on the safety at UCLA as well as the safety culture 
around the country.  For this reason, some commented that the penalties against Harran 
were not severe enough.9-13 Legally, the laboratory supervisor is ultimately responsible 
for what happens in his laboratory.6 Thus, if someone is injured due to improper 
technique or training, ignorance regarding the use of safety equipment, or a similar lack 
of knowledge regarding laboratory hazards, the researcher’s current supervisor is 
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responsible, regardless of any training a given researcher may have received at another 
institution.  
The legal side of the argument also varied greatly.  Some contended that Professor 
Harran should not have been initially charged so severely.10, 12 Others debated whether 
the outcome of this case would be a cause for change at any universities outside of 
California.10, 12-13 Since this was the first time a PI was criminally charged due to a 
laboratory accident, there are likely repercussions that will not be known until future 
accidents occur at universities.   
2.2.3. Safety Program Ramifications 
Because Cal/OSHA found that the accident was a result of safety lapses and 
inadequate training, the safety program and culture at UCLA were examined very 
thoroughly by the school and Cal/OSHA, among other interested parties.3 It was 
determined that the proper protocol was not being followed at the time of the incident.  
According to the laboratory supervisor, the laboratory workers follow Sigma-Aldrich 
“Technical Bulletin AL-134” regarding the safe handling of air-sensitive reagents, 
including tBuLi.14 According to the protocol, glassware used with pyrophoric materials is 
dried in an oven rather than flame-dried, which was the method used according to the 
researcher’s notebook.  Either method should remove any water adsorbed to the surface 
of the glassware; however, flame-drying was not part of the accepted Sigma-Aldrich 
protocol the laboratory had adopted.  For small quantity transfers (up to 50 mL), a 
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syringe is acceptable to use for the transfer but only when using a 1–2 foot long needle.  
The needle that was utilized was 1.5 inches long and can be seen in Figure 4.1, 14  
 
Figure 4: The syringe and 1.5” needle used for the transfer of tBuLi on the day of the UCLA 
accident. 
 
A needle this short would require a different method than what is described in the 
technical bulletin of obtaining the tBuLi from the primary container.  A longer needle 
would be able to reach the bottom of the bottle easily, thereby avoiding the need to invert 
the bottle, which could damage the septum or create a risk of dropping the flask (see 
Figure 5).   
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Figure 5: Figures from the Sigma Aldrich Technical Bulletin AL-134 describing the proper technique 
for transferring pyrophoric reagents using a syringe equipped with a 1-2’ needle. 
 
Through no more than 50 mL was transferred at any given time, a cannula transfer would 
have been the more accepted method to transfer the total amount required, 159.5 mL.  
Using a cannula would have allowed the researcher to maintain an inert atmosphere while 
handling the pyrophoric materials as little as possible.  Exposure can more easily be 
avoided with the use of a cannula.14 
The specifics mentioned above regarding changes to and/or enforcement of the 
protocol are minor changes in the program as compared to the broader transformation 
UCLA’s safety program experienced.  One month following the accident, inspections 
were performed in over 300 laboratories at the university, many in the chemistry 
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department.  At the top of the list of operational problems was the lack of documentation 
concerning how many total laboratories and researchers were on campus.15 In a large 
campus with laboratories spread out among multiple buildings (Figure 6), this is not 
necessarily surprising, though it is a serious problem.   
 
Figure 6: Map of UCLA’s main campus with laboratory buildings denoted with red pins.16 
 
A Laboratory Safety Committee was created, and within six months of the 
incident, five ambitious recommendations were laid out for the university.  These five 
recommendations involved 1) the development of a safety culture at the university that 
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would generate safer laboratories, 2) the increase of training and outreach, 3) the increase 
of accountability and oversight of the safety staff, 4) the change to make safety a top 
priority in laboratory design, and 5) the increase of the accuracy and amount of 
inventories and recordkeeping in laboratories on campus.15, 17-18 Once these were 
enumerated, UCLA needed to overcome a major hurdle: there was a large disconnect and 
lack of trust between the safety department/staff and the laboratory researchers.  A 
partnership between safety staff and laboratory researchers was emphasized as the 
ultimate goal of this portion of safety culture at UCLA.15 
One major change that increased the partnership between safety staff and 
laboratory researchers was the implementation of a standardized inspection procedure.15 
Regardless of what kinds of hazards are present in the laboratory being inspected 
(chemical, biological, radioactive, etc.), the inspection questions and, ultimately, the 
report are either the same or comparable.  When there is less freedom to personalize 
inspections, there is greater accountability from each inspector.  Uniform inspection 
documents ensure systematic expectations for researchers and their laboratories, 
regardless if the same inspector performs each inspection every year.  Additionally, 
senior laboratory safety officers within the safety department at UCLA double-check the 
laboratory inspections and make random selections to re-inspect various laboratories.  
This duplication by separate safety officers guarantees reproducibility of the results and 
determines where there are gaps to be filled.   
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After the investigations by Cal/OSHA and UCLA, the Chemical Safety Board 
(CSB) also weighed in on the incident.  The CSB released a video entitled 
“Experimenting with Danger” that discussed three chemistry laboratory incidents: the 
fatal incident at UCLA that has been discussed in this thesis, a fatal accidental poisoning 
at Dartmouth College in 1997, and an explosion at Texas Tech University that severely 
injured a graduate student in January 2010.5, 19-20 This video focused on why the incidents 
occurred, e.g. lack of training, improper use of personal protective equipment, necessary 
changes to procedure when scaling up a reaction, etc. More than why the incidents 
occurred, the video focused a great deal on the need for a strong safety culture.  The CSB 
emphasized that by implementing and supporting a strong culture of safety, preventing 
hazards and exposures becomes a higher priority.  Because universities often do not fall 
within the general limitations set by OSHA and other regulatory bodies, universities are 
forced to develop their own allowances and limitations.   
The CSB has determined six key safety lessons to take from incidents like those 
discussed in their video, “Experimenting with Danger:” 
1. An academic institution … should ensure all safety hazards, including 
physical hazards of chemicals, are addressed. 
2. Academic institutions should ensure that practices and procedures are 
in place to verify that research-specific hazards are evaluated and 
mitigated. 
3. Comprehensive guidance on managing the hazard unique to laboratory 
chemical research in the academic environment is lacking. … 
4. Research-specific written protocols and training are necessary to 
manage laboratory research risk. 
5. An academic institution’s organizational structure should ensure that 
the safety inspector/auditor of research laboratories directly report to an 
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identified individual/office with organizational authority to implement 
safety improvements. 
6. Near-misses and previous incidents provide opportunities for education 
and improvement only if they are documented, tracked, and 
communicated to drive safety change.5, 20	   
 
Lesson 4, “researcher-specific protocols and training are necessary to manage laboratory 
research risk,” has been demonstrated at UCLA in their actions since the 2008 accident.20 
The CSB’s intent is for the research being conducted in the laboratory to be examined to 
determine how to prevent exposure.  Safety Data Sheets can be useful in this practice but 
do not give enough of the necessary information regarding how to properly and safely 
handle a hazardous chemical.  The work practices required in a laboratory need to be 
explicitly described for all researchers. 
After the accident in 2008, UCLA was required by Cal/OSHA to spend time and 
money to further develop their safety culture.15 Part of this process has been to develop 
more standard operating procedures (SOPs).  One use of SOPs is to describe in detail the 
proper work practices that a researcher should use in the laboratory to maintain safety.  
Currently, there are hundreds of chemicals included in UCLA’ SOP template library.21 At 
the top of each template, there is a disclaimer: “This is an SOP template and is not 
complete until: 1) lab specific information is entered into the box below 2) lab specific 
protocol/procedure is added to the protocol/procedure section and 3) SOP has been 
signed and dated by the PI and relevant lab personnel.”21-22 These stipulations make clear 
that each SOP needs to be particular to the laboratory that will be using it, and that all 
personnel must sign their acknowledgement of required use.  By signing an SOP, a 
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researcher is acknowledging required use (of said SOP) but also acknowledging all of the 
potential hazards of the chemical in question.   
SOPs can be used to assist in training about the hazards of the chemical and what 
to do in case of emergency.  UCLA updated their chemical hygiene plan in 2014: “[The 
plan] establishes a formal written program for protecting laboratory personnel against 
adverse health and safety hazards associated with exposure to potentially hazardous 
chemicals…”23  The many SOPs included in the template library will help to promote the 
protection of laboratory workers.  However, no two laboratories will be able to use the 
same SOP for a given chemical because the set up, procedure, and other reagents or 
solvents being used with it may differ.  
 
2.3. Primary Conclusions Regarding UCLA 
After the fatal accident in December of 2008, UCLA was obliged to make 
numerous changes to its safety program as discussed in this chapter.  One of the most 
useful changes was to better enforce the use of SOPs and the following of proper 
procedures and protocols.  SOP enforcement should make researchers more accountable 
for what reactions and procedures are performed in the laboratory.  Since these 
documents can be used as training tools, it allows for multiple researchers to get the same 
information and learn the same techniques regardless of when the training occurs.  This 
should necessarily increase the consistency in the laboratory when performing the same 
procedures.  In the future, the university will need to continue to increase the 
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documentation of trainings.  This accident has promoted UCLA to create a stronger 
culture of safety.  Other universities around the country have also been able to use this 
unfortunate accident as a learning tool.   
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CHAPTER 3: University of Minnesota 
3.1. Incident Description 
3.1.1. Explanation of Events 
The incident, a laboratory explosion with personal injury and property damage, 
at the University of Minnesota (UMN) occurred on June 17, 2014.  The reaction was 
started on June 16th and was intended to generate approximately 200 g of 
azotrimethylsilane (Me3SiN3) in poly(ethyleneglycol) (PEG) solution.  
Chlorotrimethylsilane was reacted with sodium azide to produce Me3SiN3 with sodium 
chloride as the byproduct (Equation 1).1-2   
 
              (1) 
 
The reactants were combined in a distillation apparatus and were stirred overnight.  On 
the 17th, the solution was heated slowly with stirring using a magnetic stir bar.  The 
researcher performing the reaction was walking from his office, through the laboratory, to 
the hallway and noticed that the thermometer was crooked.  He went to adjust the 
apparatus, and the reaction exploded.  The explosion caused injuries to the researcher, 
including second-degree burns, injuries to one arm and side from broken glass, and an 
injured eardrum from the blast.  There was also damage to the building, including the 
destroyed hood and experimental setup (see Figure 7).2 
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Figure 7: Damage to the fume hood due to the explosion at UMN.3 
 
3.1.2. Adjustments to the Experiment and Possible Root Causes 
The researcher had performed this reaction on numerous occasions, and while 
there is some speculation regarding the cause of the explosion,2, 4 specific changes to the 
reaction will be discussed first.  When this reaction was originally performed, the scale 
was smaller, where about half as much chlorotrimethylsilane and sodium azide were 
used.1-2 Similar to the incident at UCLA, the researcher did not make adjustments to the 
procedure due to the scaling up of the reaction.  In both the UCLA and UMN cases, the 
resulting injuries and property damage would have been somewhat mitigated by a smaller 
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amount of hazardous chemicals in use since there would have been less of the hazards 
present.   
Another adjustment the UMN researcher made was to the diethylene glycol 
dimethyl ether that was originally used as the solvent.  Diethylene glycol dimethyl ether 
was used in the literature and in prior runs;5 however, in an effort to give better mixing, 
the solvent was changed to PEG with a molecular weight of about 300 g/mol.  This 
solvent change was also reported in the literature but only when producing about half the 
desired product – 100 g instead of 200 g.6 When multiple variables in a reaction are 
changed at the same time, there is a greater risk of something going wrong.   
One possible explanation for the blast is that hydrazoic acid may have been 
generated in the reaction vessel.  Hydrazoic acid (HN3) is shock sensitive, and upon 
heating, explosive.7-8 Though it was not one of the reagents added to the flask, it can be 
generated when sodium azide reacts with acid.  The solvent may have reacted with 
sodium azide to generate hydrazoic acid in solution, which was being heated.2, 7 Another 
similar explanation is that the PEG might not have been completely anhydrous, despite 
the fact that a newly opened bottle was used.  If this was the case, the water could have 
provided the requisite protons needed to produce hydrazoic acid in the heated solution.2 
An alternative explanation was that the magnetic stir bar had stopped moving, 
which would allow unreacted sodium azide to settle on the bottom of the flask and be 
overheated.2 Heated sodium azide can violently release nitrogen, which may have caused 
the explosion.  This possibility is realistic due to the researcher noticing the crooked 
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thermometer.  If the stir bar had been working correctly, it is reasonable to theorize that 
the thermometer should have remained in its correct position.  If the solution had been 
continuously stirred, unreacted sodium azide would not have been able to settle to the 
bottom of the flask. 
 
3.2. Safety Ramifications Due to the Incident 
This incident happened about five and a half years after the death at UCLA.  The 
ramifications for UCLA had been an impetus for other universities around the country to 
increase their cultures of safety to prevent similar incidents from occurring in their 
schools’ laboratories.  To this end, UMN created the Joint Safety Team (JST) (see 
Section 3.4) in April of 2012, two years before the explosion.9 Similar to UCLA, UMN 
administrators and safety officials implemented immediate changes to its safety program 
to help prevent reoccurrences of the UCLA incident or similar accidents.  The change 
that may yield the most impact is the required use of “Safe Operations Cards” (SOC).  
The cards are “used as a tool to complete hazard assessment and planning for research 
activities.”10 These cards were originally developed by Dow Chemical in an effort to 
stimulate safe practices in research laboratories.  The SOCs were made available to UMN 
due to a partnership with the chemical company.  Dow Chemical Company formed 
eleven safety partnerships in 2011 with universities across the country.  This partnership 
between Dow and UMN has UMN receiving $17 million from Dow over a five-year 
period to “strengthen research and enable a building expansion.”11 UMN researchers had 
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sparingly used these cards before, but the incident has served as a catalyst for wide spread 
adoption due to increased enforcement.4 SOCs need to be completed for any reactions 
completed in the laboratory.  There are blank sections to be completed by the researchers: 
reaction, contact information, intended conditions, hazards, and emergency shutdown.  
This card was based on Dow’s creation and has been adjusted and edited to be as useful 
as possible for all laboratories at UMN (see Section 3.3). 
Since this incident, Professor William Tolman, the chair of the UMN chemistry 
department, has initiated a limit on the scale of this particular type of reaction, and any 
similar reactions, to no larger than 5 g theoretical yield.1, 4 Scaling up of reactions is quite 
common in research laboratories, especially for the process of synthesizing starting 
material.  Issues arise when the unexpected reactions/outcomes materialize at the larger 
scale.  When using relatively small amounts, any potential damages from unintended 
reactions can be more easily managed.  Because the reaction was on a large scale, the 
explosion that occurred had more material available that was able to react violently.  The 
greater amount of material ultimately resulted in scope of the injuries and damages to the 
researcher and the laboratory, respectively.  Limiting the scale of potentially dangerous 
(e.g. explosive) experiments will prevent large-scale unintended reactions from 
happening again, thereby reducing the overall risk of personal injury and property 
damage. 
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3.3. Analysis of and Changes to Preexisting Protocols 
Aside from the SOC mentioned above, there are four other “cards” than can, and 
should, be posted on laboratory doors or fume hoods to give any non-researchers, such as 
emergency responders, or other researchers, such as those not performing the experiment 
in question, information about what is happening in the laboratory.  “In Case of 
Emergency,” “Sensitive Materials, Avoid,” Unattended Hazards,” and “Intended 
Conditions” are the four card options.   
On the “In Case of Emergency” card (Figure 8), there is contact information, but 
there is also a section to describe an emergency shut down procedure.   
 
 
Figure 8: SOC “In Case of Emergency” card from UMN to be completed for any reaction.10 
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A number of options are listed that can be checked off (e.g. “evacuate lab,” “drop lab 
jack,” “turn off ___,” etc.).  The “In Case of Emergency” card allows anyone not familiar 
with the particular reaction the ability to keep everyone safe while also maintaining the 
integrity of the reaction.   
The “Sensitive Materials” card gives options to be checked, similar to the 
emergency card, but in this case, it is for what types of materials to avoid (Figure 9). 
 
 
Figure 9: SOC “Sensitive Materials” card from UMN to be completed for any reaction that has 
specific hazards when mixed with other materials.10 
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This card allows anyone outside the laboratory to understand what should not be 
introduced to the laboratory space with respect to whatever is currently being done or 
materials stored in the laboratory.  For instance one option that can be checked is “Air,” 
meaning that whatever is in the laboratory should not come into contact with atmospheric 
air.  If the sensitive reaction were in a hood, this card would make it clear that it must be 
kept under an inert atmosphere to avoid potentially dangerous reactions. 
For any reaction left unattended, the “Unattended Hazards” card will describe 
what the potential hazards are (Figure 10).   
 
 




This card could be especially useful for emergency responders.  If, for instance, the fire 
alarm in the building is tripped, fire fighters will be able to determine if the reactions 
occurring in the laboratory could be the reason for the alarm or if they should move on to 
the next laboratory.   
The “Intended Conditions” card can be used to describe the intentional 
conditions of the reaction (Figure 11).  For instance, there is an option of “Keep 
DARK/covered” that would help anyone to avoid destroying work by exposing the 
reaction to light.  This card can also be used to describe what the reaction should look 
like in terms of both condition (stirring) and appearance (color).   
 
 
Figure 11: SOC “Intended Conditions” card from UMN to be completed for any reaction.10 
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If one of the intended conditions were not met another researcher would be able to notify 
the person performing the experiment that something incorrect is happening.  The 
experimenter would then be able to assess the situation to determine if the laboratory is 
safe to occupy to continue work.  These cards can be posted on the laboratory door so 
that there is no need to enter the laboratory to assess the condition of the area.  By using 
the same template on every laboratory door in a building, emergency responders can be 
trained to look for any hazards listed on the cards before entering a laboratory, thereby 
keeping everyone safer from potential exposures to hazardous materials. 
 
3.4. Joint Safety Team 
As mentioned above, two years prior to the chemical explosion, UMN had 
developed the Joint Safety Team (JST).9, 12-15 The JST consists not of faculty and staff, 
but rather of graduate student and postdoctoral researchers from two departments, 1) 
chemistry and 2) chemical engineering and mathematical science.  One objective of this 
group is to improve on safety culture at UMN.  Similar to the conditions noted in Chapter 
2, safety culture not only refers to the manner in which experiments are executed but also 
to attitudes and the perception of those inside and outside the laboratory, other 
researchers, staff members, etc.  Following the explosion in the fall of 2014, JST 
implemented a new safety campaign called CARE, which represents four safety areas: 
Compliance, Awareness, Resources, and Education.9, 16 Each area focuses on particular 
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safety-centric themes that can be overlooked in research laboratories.  There are ten 
initiatives that have been introduced within the CARE campaign (see Table 1). 
 
Table 1: Ten initiatives of the CARE campaign at UMN.9 
Initiative Description CARE Category 
Identify 10 guidelines 
for a safer lab 
Document describing most important aspects 
of lab safety 
Awareness 
Kickoff event 
Highly attended event to introduce the JST 
and identify new goals for safety culture 
Awareness 
Standard lab signage 
Templates to display hazards and contact 




Brief discussion or presentation on a safety 
topics at the beginning of group meetings 
and departmental seminars 
Awareness and 
Education 
Weekly safety note 
A short safety tip sent weekly by email to 










Semiannual student-let audits to evaluate 
laboratory housekeeping and compliance 
Compliance 
JST website 










Week focused on reducing clutter and waste 
from labs, in conjunction with DEHS 
Resources 
 
One of the ten initiatives that can help promote a strong culture of safety is the 
“Weekly Safety Note,” which is a brief safety tip sent to faculty, staff, and students via 
email.9 If this is sent out early in the week, it could encourage researchers to keep safety 
in mind all week while planning and performing various experiments in the laboratory.  
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An analogous promotion to safety is the “Safety Moment” that is either discussed at 
group meetings or during departmental seminars.  In either format, the Safety Moment is 
at the beginning of the meeting or seminar.  Similar to the weekly safety note, the safety 
moment discussed can create a stronger safety culture by increasing awareness.  One 
example of how to use a Safety Moment is to discuss a near miss that happened in the 
laboratory.  A near miss can be described as anything just short of an accident.17-18 An 
example is if a researcher drops a flask containing nitric acid on the floor, but the flask 
does not break.  The laboratory group can learn how to prevent future accidents from the 
near misses that occur.  Discussing the near miss, or other safety related topics, can lead 
to the researchers caring more about safety in general.  By having these discussions at the 
beginning of the meeting instead of the end, it can emphasize the importance of a strong 
safety culture by maintaining that it is not an afterthought.  Both of these initiatives are 
under two CARE categories: Awareness and Education. 
An interesting initiative under the category of Compliance is “Laboratory 
Walkthroughs.”  Students lead a biannual audit assessing housekeeping and compliance 
in the laboratory.9 By having the students run the audit process, there is a greater sense of 
responsibility and ownership they undertake to ensure the laboratory is in compliance 
with regulations.  This initiative also encourages the students to be more aware of the 
changes in regulations to stay in compliance whether that awareness is through the JST’s 
other initiatives or not.  Similarly to UCLA’s objective of creating a greater partnership 
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among safety staff and researchers, this type of audit process will inevitably yield a 
stronger partnership. 
There is one initiative in particular in the last category, Resources, that likewise 
encourages cooperation between the safety staff and researchers.  The JST has initiated a 
“Cleanup Week” that encourages laboratory groups to remove clutter and waste from 
their laboratories.9 This cleanup can be used to eliminate excess hazards and decrease the 
chance of an accident from occurring or escalating.  Laboratories are able to remove any 
hazardous materials that are no longer needed, thereby eliminating the hazard altogether.  
The next chapter will in part discuss the similarities between UMN’s Cleanup Week and 
UVM’s Chemistry Safety Day. 
 
3.5. Primary Conclusions Regarding UMN 
Though UMN had created the Joint Safety Team before the incident in their 
chemistry department, new lessons were learned from the outcomes of the explosion.  
Similar to UCLA, enforcement of using proper protocol and procedures will now be more 
thoroughly applied, and new protocols and procedures have been developed to avoid 
similar occurrences from happening in the future.  The JST has been a strong source of 
safety awareness at the university.  If it continues to be a presence and keep safety a 
priority, the number of incidents and accidents will likely decrease. 
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CHAPTER 4: University of Vermont 
4.1. Timeline of Change in the Safety Program at UVM 
4.1.1. Development of the Hazardous Chemicals of Concern Online Inventory 
The safety program at the University of Vermont (UVM), similar to other 
universities, focuses not only on the chemistry department but all departments with 
hazards including chemical, biological, radioactive, and physical.  The Laboratory Health 
and Safety Policy states UVM’s objective as “providing a healthy and safe working and 
learning environment, and to supporting environmentally sound practices.”1 When 
incidents occur at comparable universities, there are opportunities to strengthen the safety 
culture locally.  For instance, after the incident at UMN, a safety professional from UMN 
delivered a seminar to the chemistry department at UVM to share experiences, results, 
and actions.  Discussing the possible causes of an incident and how to prevent 
recurrences in the future allows both universities to be better prepared.  Incidents like the 
explosion at UMN create opportunities to create a dialogue among safety staff and 
laboratories researchers.   
Incidents at UVM and various universities have contributed to the evolution of the 
safety program at UVM.  The timeline shown in Figure 12 shows a very general and 
basic analysis of the safety program at UVM between 2007 and 2012.b  In that five-year 
span of time, the program began to evolve into the program it is today. 
                                                
b The information in the timeline was sourced from documentation maintained at UVM’s 
Environmental Safety Facility. 
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Figure 12: Recent timeline of change of aspects of the safety program at UVM. 
 
One incident at UVM that sparked a great change in the safety program was a 
laboratory fire.  A fire started in a non-metal fume hood Memorial Day Weekend, 2007 
and caused $2 million in damage/repairs and two years of delayed work.  The smoke that 
was generated by the fire was exhausted out of the building by the fume hood.  Hence, 
the smoke detectors outside of the fume hood in the laboratory were unable to detect the 




Figure 13: Fire damage to the fume hood from the 2007 fire at UVM.c 
 
Fortunately, there were no deaths or serious injuries of either researchers or emergency 
personnel, but several firefighters received emergency care.  After the fire, UVM’s online 
chemical registry system was developed.  Every researcher responsible for a laboratory 
must now register that space – list all researchers in the laboratory and complete the 
Hazardous Chemicals of Concern (HCOC) online chemical inventory.  The Burlington 
Fire Department (BFD) can access this inventory on route to any UVM building to see 
what hazards are present (Figure 14).   
                                                
c Photograph is from Risk Management and Safety’s archives at UVM. 
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Figure 14: The screen Burlington Fire Department sees when logging on to the campus wide 
emergency response report online.2 
 
If there was a similar system in place before the fire in 2007, the need for emergency 
medical treatment could have been more easily avoided.  BFD can now see what hazards 
are located in the building before or during a fire alarm or emergency call response.  The 
responders are safer as a direct result of updated inventories and being able to contact 
someone responsible for the laboratories in a building. 
Once the building to which they are responding is chosen, BFD is able to view 
all hazards associated with individual laboratory spaces (see Figure 15). 
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Figure 15: An example of laboratory-space specific data the Burlington Fire Department can find 
when choosing to view a building’s hazards.3 
 
All inventories are required to be updated a minimum of every six months to ensure 
accuracy.  The implementation of the online inventory is one part of the annual training 
BFD receives from UVM Risk Management and Safety personnel.  A better partnership 
has been created between UVM and BFD since the fire and its resulting impacts. 
Similar to UCLA’s Laboratory Hazard Assessment Tool (LHAT) the HCOC 
allows for the transfer of information from researchers in a particular laboratory to a non-
laboratory member of the university.  One difference between the HCOC and LHAT is 
the latter focuses on hazard assessment as an informative tool as opposed to hazard 
communication.4 Hazard assessment refers to the evaluation of the hazards present in the 
laboratory and is accomplished by LHATs.  Hazard communication refers to the 
 44 
communication of information with anyone that may contact the hazards and is achieved 
by HCOC.  LHATs somewhat combine the usefulness of an SOP with informative power 
though the communication of that assessment.  The evaluation of the hazards is 
completed through filling out the LHAT form.  Therefore, there is an opportunity to add 
value to the HCOC by increasing the information that is required to be made available, 
including assessing the hazards present.  However, there is a fine line between offering 
enough information to be useful and giving too much information.  At this point, UVM is 
focused on keeping the information updated to ensure that what information is present is 
actually useful for emergency responders because it is accurate.  BFD is able to see an 
abbreviated version of the HCOC so that they are able to assess the building’s hazards 
before entering it.2 Forms like the LHAT have too much information to determine and 
extract the vital information to use as a quick assessment tool. 
4.1.2. Development of the Chemistry Safety Committee 
Another development at UVM that happened prior to the accident at UCLA was 
the creation of the Chemistry Safety Committee in August of 2008.  Committee 
membership includes seven to ten chemistry faculty/staff, the Laboratory Safety 
Coordinator for the College of Arts and Sciences, and the Assistant Director of Risk 
Management & Safety for Health and Safety, and it is chaired by a chemistry faculty 
member.  The Chemistry Safety Committee holds biannual meetings to examine various 
safety topics ranging from recent incidents to upcoming events and seminars to ongoing 
concerns.  One objective of the Chemistry Safety Committee is to encourage safe work 
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practices in the chemistry department.  In other words, the committee looks to increase 
the strength of the safety culture within all chemistry laboratories. 
The Chemistry Safety Committee is similar to the Joint Safety Team at UMN in a 
few ways.  One aspect of the Chemistry Safety Committee that is comparable to the Joint 
Safety Team is that both are focused on safety culture and its improvement in chemistry 
laboratories.  However, where the Chemistry Safety Committee is all faculty and staff, 
the Joint Safety Team is comprised of only graduate students and post-doctoral 
researchers.5 The Chemistry Safety Committee could gain some insight through another 
viewpoint by adding graduate students/post-docs to the committee.  This different 
perspective could add value to the Chemistry Safety Committee by ensuring that all 
needs in the department are acknowledged.   
The committee at UVM has already had some success in addressing its objective 
of encouraging safer work practices.  For example, the committee has implemented 
Chemistry Safety Day.  At this annual, daylong event, the entire chemistry department 
uses that time to update required trainings, participate in various drills, attend a 
departmental safety seminar, and engage in laboratory cleanup.  Laboratory cleanup 
consists of cleaning out the laboratory of old chemicals, wastes, and papers.  The first 
annual Chemistry Safety Day was held in May of 2012, and this has been an annual event 
ever since.  The first Safety Day supplied researchers with the ability to take live fire 
extinguisher training and to remove old chemicals, wastes, papers, and broken equipment 
from the laboratory.  Chemistry is the only department to currently require the live fire 
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extinguisher training to be completed by all of its researchers, faculty, and teaching 
assistants.  The first Chemistry Safety Day in 2012 had participation from 88% of all 
researchers in the fire extinguisher training. 
Of the more than 500 laboratories at UVM, the chemistry department has some of 
the highest potential hazards.  This department has maintained its priority status, which 
includes receiving yearly safety audits.  Events like Chemistry Safety Day help to 
minimize hazards and increase hazard awareness among undergraduate and graduate 
students, postdoctoral researchers, faculty, and staff.   
The committee focuses mainly on the research laboratories in chemistry, but it 
explored how to increase safety awareness in undergraduate students taking chemistry 
laboratories as a portion of general chemistry and organic chemistry classes as well.  The 
goal is to engage undergraduate students in laboratory safety as soon as (or before) the 
students enter the laboratory.  There was a small safety book that had been used in all 
beginner undergraduate laboratories, and while there was some good information 
contained, the book itself did little to encourage the students to take an interest in the 
topic of safety.  In an effort to better train undergraduate students in safety, the committee 
developed a new online training tool.  Two chemistry faculty members, two chemistry 
staff members, and the laboratory safety coordinator for chemistry created an online 
training that the students are now required to complete and need to achieve a minimum 
score of 80% on an assessment prior to engaging in experimental work in the laboratory.  
The training is in the format of a PowerPoint presentation, which is displayed via the 
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Blackboard online learning platform, where students are able to access the training and 
complete the assessment.  The training itself includes the basic safety information for 
instructional laboratory work including, personal preparedness, how to recognize 
chemical hazards, SDS information, routes of exposure, engineering and administrative 
controls, proper PPE, what to do in case of a chemical spill, housekeeping, how to 
properly handle chemical waste, and emergency equipment/what to do in case of an 
emergency.  The feedback from the students taking the new training has been very 
positive, especially any students that had previously used the safety book mentioned 
above. 
4.1.3. Other Changes to UVM’s Safety Program 
While the Chemistry Safety Committee has been beneficial to the promotion and 
improvement of safety culture within UVM’s chemistry department, there are other 
factors that have facilitated changes in the safety program at the university as a whole.  
As noted, the accident at UCLA was one contributing factor in the creation of UVM’s 
Laboratory Safety Policy but not the only factor.  In 2011, a laboratory safety working 
group was created specifically to further develop laboratory safety.  This group was 
created as a result of safety concerns at UVM as well as incidents at both UCLA and 
Yale6, d (see Figure 16).   
 
                                                
d In 2011, a 22-year-old undergraduate was working in a chemistry laboratory machine 
shop when her hair was caught in the lathe, resulting in the researcher’s death.35  
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Figure 16: Contributing factors for the creation of the laboratory safety group at UVM. 
 
The accident at UCLA discussed in Chapter 2 made the need for a robust safety policy 
quite evident.  This was one of two fatal accidents at prestigious universities that 
contributed to the safety policy.  The accident at Yale in 2011 involved a researcher 
working in a chemistry shop on a lathe when her hair was caught in the spinning 
mechanism.6 The types of laboratories vary greatly at UVM, and these accidents clearly 
showed a need for a stronger safety culture.  The third factor was the ending of Project 
XL.e  Project XL, which stands for “eXcellence and Leadership,” was a national initiative 
that tests innovative ways of achieving better and more cost-effective public health and 
                                                
e “The focus of [Project XL] is on the implementation of an institution-wide laboratory 
environmental management program which effectively minimizes, reuses, collects and 
disposes of waste chemicals from campus teaching and research activities.”36  
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environmental protection.7 Project XL determined the waste management at the 
university, and it “was developed because the standard hazardous waste regulations 
established under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act were preventing 
laboratories in higher education from fully developing their pollution prevention 
programs.”7 There was potential for a big shift in waste management due to the impeding 
end of this project.   
The fourth and fifth factors were the Department of Environmental Conservation 
(DEC) inspection of the UVM campus and the specific inspection of the chemistry 
building found a number of non-compliance issues that needed to be handled.  The issues 
included missing documentation, labeling problems or old waste, self-inspections were 
not completed, and two laboratories had significant housekeeping concerns.  Overall, the 
inspection cost UVM almost $20,000 in fines.  The combination of these five factors 
(Figure 16) led to the creation of the Laboratory Health and Safety Policy (Figure 17). 
There were 15 members of the Laboratory Safety Group at the time of its 
inception including representatives from general safety, radiation safety, chemical safety, 
laboratory safety, biosafety, and environmental compliance; the Director of Risk 
Management; two Assistant Deans for Research (College of Medicine and College of 
Arts and Science); the Vice President for Research; and the Chief Compliance Officer.  
The working group was convened to generate a robust Safety Policy.  The reasoning 




Figure 17: UVM’s Laboratory Health and Safety Policy’s general statement and reasoning behind its 
creation.1 
 
In the last few years, UVM has made a number of changes and updates to its 
safety program.  For example, the organizational structure within the Risk Management 
& Safety (RMS) Department has been adjusted to allow for safety staff members to spend 
more time with individual researchers when appropriate and needed.  There is a greater 
opportunity for one-on-one trainings for new principle investigators (PIs) and laboratory 
safety officers in the laboratory.  New trainings have been created and older trainings 
have been updated, both classroom and online trainings.  More targeted trainings allow 
for researchers to gain specific insight before working with particular hazardous materials 
or equipment.  Furthermore, the safety websites have almost all been updated within the 
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last five years.  All of these updates and new creations have been prepared to ensure that 
researchers are getting the most up-to-date information possible and that they can easily 
learn about any new regulations that would affect their work or their safety procedures in 
the laboratory. 
 
4.2. Further Comparisons Among UCLA, UMN, and UVM 
4.2.1. Documentation/Signage for Current Experiments 
The safety program at UVM is comparable in various ways to the safety 
programs at both UCLA and UMN.  As previously mentioned, the HCOC at UVM is 
similar to the LHAT at UCLA, though the first is more focused on hazard communication 
and the latter is more about hazard assessment.  Also, the Chemistry Safety Committee 
and the Joint Safety Team were both created for the purpose of promoting and improving 
safety culture.  However, there are other comparisons to be made.  For instance, UVM 
uses an “Unattended Operations Form” to define what procedures are being performed in 
the laboratory without any researcher present (Figure 18).   
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UNATTENDED OPERATIONS TAKING PLACE 
 
INSTRUCTIONS 
An Unattended Operations Sign must be filled out completely and attached to the 
laboratory door facing the hallway whenever any equipment, experiment, process or 
operation is left unattended and could pose a potential risk to health, safety or security of 
personnel or property.  Users must post all applicable information, including emergency 
shut-down instructions. For more info, contact safety@uvm.edu  
 
This information is used to inform other building occupants, Physical Plant personnel, 
Safety staff and other Emergency Responders in the event of an unexpected reaction, 
overheating, odor or emergency.  
 
Date: Start Time:  ________   (circle)  AM     PM  
Name:  
 
End Time:   ________   (circle)  AM     PM  
Phone: Will Check Again:  in #_____min’s, 
 in #_____hrs,   in #_____day(s) 
PI/Supervisor Name: PI/Supervisor Phone: 
 
 
The Unattended Operation taking place involve the following hazards: 
Circle ALL that apply and list specifics as requested. 
 
Equipment Hazard 
Muffle Furnace Temp: ___________  (circle)   F   or   C    
What exactly is being heated in oven/furnace? 
______________________________________ 
Chemical Fume Hood 
 
Chemicals in use (circle all that apply) Amount: ________  
Corrosive ,  Toxic,   Reactive,  Flammable   
Compressed Gas Gas Type: _______________________ 
Vacuum Pump  Type of oil: ______________________ 
Electrical Volts/Watts: __________ (circle) AC  or  DC 
Hot plate/Ignition Sources Type/Temp: ___________________________ 
Continuous Water Flowing  
Other:  Describe “other”: 
 
Provide an additional description of what is taking place: 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Emergency Shut off is located: ___________________________________________________ 
 
Questions about this form?  Contact safety@uvm.edu or go to uvm.edu/safety 
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This form is similar to the “Unattended Hazards” SOC used at UMN.  The Unattended 
Operations form is to be used “whenever any equipment, experiment, process or 
operation is left unattended and could pose a potential risk to health, safety or security of 
personnel or property.”8-9 This form was originally created in 2001, but it has been 
updated as recently as 2012.  Both forms are used to display information to anyone 
outside the laboratory.  If something happens in the laboratory, researchers, safety staff, 
or emergency responders would all be able to better assess the risks of entering the 
laboratory.  
4.2.2. Laboratory Inspection Procedures 
Another area of comparison is the safety inspection procedures at each university.  
As mentioned, the UVM chemistry department laboratories are high priority.  For 
auditing purposes, that means safety staff inspects the laboratories every year.  Beginning 
in 2012, LabCliQ has been used to track the inspections and corrective actions 
required/completed for all UVM laboratories online.  Thus, the same questions are 
answered regardless of the laboratory’s department or which safety professional is 
completing the inspection.  Adoption of the online platform was done to normalize the 
auditing process, though the standardization can only go so far.  In a similar manner, 
UCLA laboratories are inspected using a standardized approach.10 The difference at 
UCLA is that there are monthly reviews of recent inspections, and another member of the 
safety staff redoes an inspection randomly chosen.10 This is to ensure the reproducibility 
of the audit process.  As at UVM and UCLA, UMN has an auditing checklist that has 
 54 
minimal open-ended questions to be answered.11 This, again, allows for a more 
normalized auditing process.  Comparing the different schools’ processes, it is clear that 
normalization is the goal.   
4.2.3. Greater Laboratory Training Requirements 
There have been increases in the number of safety trainings at all universities 
discussed here.  At UVM, training has increased greatly, as illustrated in Figure 19.  
 
 
Figure 19: Safety trainings taken by UVM affiliates from 2009 through 2014.  
 
The large increase in the number of completed trainings from 2012 to 2013 was partially 
due to the increased number of required trainings for all laboratory workers and better 
enforcement of the requirements.  This was a period of catching up with trainings for 
2542	   3822	   3736	   4754	  
8365	   7910	  881	   877	   806	  
1270	  

























Safety	  Training	  by	  Year	  and	  Platform	  
Classroom	  Online	  
 55 
many researchers.  Another explanation for the large increase from 2012 to 2013 is the 
implementation of the annual online refresher training.  2013 was the first year the 
refresher was offered and required for all researchers that were at UVM since 2012 or 
earlier.  The number of completed trainings will likely drop slightly over the next few 
years as researchers that have been at UVM for a number of years finish completing the 
basic training requirements.  Instead, new students, faculty, and staff will complete the 
majority of all recorded trainings, and near the same number each year will complete the 
annual refresher trainings.  Similar to UVM, at UCLA and UMN trainings have been 
added to the requirements for all laboratory workers.  This increase in safety training 
activities is targeted at ultimately generating a higher level of safety awareness. 
The undergraduate training that is displayed through BlackBoard is not recorded 
as part of the total trainings delivered by RMS.  Roughly 3000 undergraduate chemistry 
students take the safety training each academic year through BlackBoard before 
performing any laboratory experiments for class.  This number includes general and 
organic chemistry students.  This number is slightly inflated since there are students 
repeating the trainings from general chemistry when they take organic chemistry.  
Therefore, any student taking organic chemistry will see the same information twice, 
hopefully reinforcing the culture of safety that is being cultivated. 
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4.3. Past Incidents 
UVM safety staff utilizes and learns from incidents that occur at other 
universities, however, there have been a number of incidents at UVM and within the 
chemistry department specifically.  The incidents are reported based on the injured 
person’s status – either employee or student.  For employees, there have been 16 
incidents between 2006 and 2012 (Figure 20).f   
 
Figure 20: Employee accidents in the chemistry department at UVM from 2006 through 2015 divided 
by type of injury. 
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There are not enough data points to determine any significant trends.  There were no 
reported incidents in 2013, 2014, and through June 2015.  Lacerations were the most 
common injury, 7 of the 16 accidents.  The number of incidents from year to year appears 
to be random, fluctuating from one to five without any steady increase or decrease in 
occurrence.  Continued analysis of these reports could potentially yield a trend in the 
future. 
Though undergraduate student accidents have not been the focus up to this point 
in the discussion, UVM follows up with various injuries and accidents in the teaching 
laboratories as necessary.  RMS’s “follow up” process endeavors to determine the root 
causes of accidents.  This causation determination may be through meeting with the 
researcher, observing performance of the task or experiment that was done during the 
accident, or sampling for exposure.  There have been 59 reported incidents in teaching 
laboratories from April of 2009 to April of 2015 (Figure 21).g   
                                                
g The data for Figure 21 was compiled through RMS documented reports of the incidents. 
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Figure 21: Student accidents in chemistry teaching laboratories at UVM from 2009 through 2015 
divided by type of injury. 
 
Similar to the employee records, lacerations were the most common injury, 22 of the 59 
incidents.  Though the number is more than a third of the total, most of the students did 
not require emergency attention and care.  Chemical exposures were the second most 
common injury with 20 incidents being a result of exposure.  Again, the high variability 
and small sample size makes it very difficult to determine any significant trends.  There is 
a slight decrease in the number of total incidents from year to year; however, this could 
be for a variety of reasons.  A possible explanation is that the follow up procedures done 
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of safety in the laboratory.  The chemistry department in particular has made an effort to 
remove more hazardous chemicals/experiments from the teaching curriculum.  By 
eliminating some of the hazards, the department is able to mitigate injuries from 
occurring.  Another possibility is that the injuries are simply not being reported.  Injuries 
that do not require medical attention are less likely to be reported since there is no need 
of a formal report for insurance purposes.  If injuries go unreported, the number of 
incidents would be deceptively low. 
In cataloging this data, an opportunity for UVM to enhance the follow up 
procedure that is used at the university was identified.  For instance, there is no single 
form or procedure that is followed by all safety personnel when performing a follow up.  
Though the questions asked may be similar and the same information may be gleaned 
from the process, a more uniform procedure would be best.  There is another opportunity 
in the way the incidents are reported.  To date, the incidents are difficult to find and trend, 
regardless of the size of the data set.  A more user-friendly reporting format for both 
employee and student reports is needed.  It is insufficient to be simply reporting the 
accidents if reports cannot be found easily and aggregate data obtained.  If all incidents 
were collected in the same database, potential trends could be found.  This analysis, 
absent from current procedures, would ultimately help to prevent serious injuries and 
accidents from recurring in the future. 
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4.4. Primary Conclusions Regarding UVM 
UVM has been motivated by the incidents that have happened at the university 
and other universities around the country to further develop the safety program.  Various 
accidents are discussed in RMS-delivered classroom trainings to make researchers aware 
of what is progressing around them at similar universities.  It is emphasized that 
researchers need to be more aware in general of their surroundings, especially when 
working with hazardous chemicals, materials, or equipment in the laboratories on 
campus.  UVM uses not only the accidents that happen in chemistry laboratories or with 
hazardous chemicals but other hazards as well to ensure all students, faculty, and staff are 
working safely with the hazardous materials or equipment.   
However, data collection is insufficient to determine trends and learn what types 
of accidents can and should be prevented.  It is not enough to collect the data, it also 
needs to be evaluated and cataloged in a useful way.  If UVM is to continue to learn from 
accidents, there needs to be a better way to evaluate steps that need to be done to avoid 
reoccurrences.   
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSIONS AND NEXT STEPS 
5.1. Training Recommendations 
Incidents and their repercussions at UCLA, UMN, and UVM were discussed at 
length above, but further steps after completing all of the safety adjustments have not yet 
been considered.  UCLA has made great progress to increase the strength of the safety 
culture at the university as described in Chapter 2.1-2 The numerous SOP templates 
available for researchers to adapt to their own procedures are immensely useful.2 If the 
researchers use them appropriately as a tool to create their own SOPs, the template 
library will be invaluable to the research community.  Aside from the SOP library, the 
increased training and documentation will help to keep everyone safer – those working in 
the laboratories as well as any emergency personnel that may need to enter the laboratory 
space at any time.  The number of trainings received by UCLA affiliates has increased 
steadily from 2007 through 2012, as illustrated in Figure 22.  
 
Figure 22: Total trainings received by UCLA affiliates from 2007 through 2012.  The blue portion 
represents online trainings, and the red portion represents classroom trainings.1 
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Similar to UVM, there is likely some amount of back training students, faculty, 
and staff that had not previously received required trainings from 2009 through 2011 as 
can be recognized through the large increase in total training participants.  In future years, 
it may be possible to see a slightly fluctuating plateau of trainings completed, such as 
from 2011 to 2012, as it will be only new researchers completing the majority of training 
courses required.  One aspect of the UCLA training program that is not seen at every 
university is a matrix to determine what trainings are required based on what tasks that 
specific researcher is performing in the laboratory.  The matrix includes different 
categories of required trainings for those working with animals, with shop equipment, 
responsible for a laboratory, etc.3 At UVM, there are a number of online and classroom 
training requirements for every laboratory worker that are clearly indicated; however, it 
can be difficult for a researcher to determine which of the more specialized trainings are 
also required and for whom these requirements apply.4 A more precise training matrix 
would be a beneficial addition to the safety program for researchers to be better able to 
complete the necessary requirements.   
 
5.2. Incident Follow Up Procedures and Reporting 
Even with all of the progress already made, there are still more steps to be taken 
to ensure the safest workplace/laboratory possible.  The worst outcome after the prior 
incidents would be to become complacent with the safety program.  As noted in Chapter 
1, there is always room for improvement, features to learn new best practices, and new 
 64 
regulations to follow.  One area that could use improvement at UVM is the recording and 
tracking of accidents and injuries that happen on campus.  The current process of incident 
reporting and follow up is outlined in Figure 23.   
 
 
Figure 23: Reporting process for accidents and injuries at UVM. 
 
The accident or injury goes through the same reporting and follow up procedure whether 
the injured person is an employee or a student.  After the injured person has received 
medical treatment – anything from a bandage to emergency care at the hospital – his or 
her laboratory supervisor will complete the report to send in to RMS, ideally within 72 
hours of the incident. 
After the incident is reported, the Laboratory Safety Coordinator from RMS 
assigned to that department does a follow up with the person(s) that had experienced the 
injury or accident and likely his or her PI.  As discussed in Section 4.3, the follow up 
process endeavors to determine the root causes of the accident.  Depending on the 
incident, other researchers in the laboratory may be included in the discussion to 
determine root causes.  Follow up may include a simple discussion among researchers 
and safety staff, a cooperation to develop a safer procedure, exposure monitoring during 
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experimentation, or a number of other methods depending on the accident or injury in 
question, including those described in Section 4.3.  The overall goal is to prevent 
additional similar injuries or accidents from happening.  After the follow up is completed, 
the RMS report is sent to another member of RMS for insurance purposes or it is filed.  It 
is difficult at best to find information about a specific type of injury because there is no 
useful way of sorting the reports.  A database needs to be created to make the reports—
from the PI as well as the report from RMS staff—useful for tracking purposes and to 
determine if any similar accidents happened in the past.   
 
5.3. Final Thoughts 
As detailed in Section 3.3 and Section 4.1, UMN and UVM have similar signage 
for any operations left unattended.  However, UMN has other signage that could be 
useful for UVM to mimic.  For instance, fillable forms that can communicate more 
information to anyone outside of the laboratory could be useful.  The availability of one 
or multiple forms that can be tailored to a specific reaction, while still following a 
particular template would allow for valuable information to be conveyed.  Similar to the 
SOCs that UMN uses, concise information that can be easily understood by emergency 
responders would be beneficial. 
The Chemistry Safety Committee was thoroughly discussed in Section 4.1.2, 
however, most departments at UVM do not have specific safety committees.  If each 
department created a committee, events like safety days could be held in other buildings 
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across campus.  Though the chemistry department has laboratories with some of the 
highest hazards on campus, it is not the only department that would benefit from an 
increase in the overall culture of safety.  At a minimum, each department should have an 
assigned faculty or staff member to oversee the building’s safety needs and coordinate 
with RMS to increase the culture of safety. 
Ultimately, the safety culture at universities needs to be top priority to minimize 
accidents and maximize laboratory effectiveness.  If no other reason resonates with 
researchers, laboratory accidents impede progress in research.  Therefore, universities 
need to continue to develop their safety programs and promote safety culture.   
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